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The "Bad Samaritan" Paradigm,  
by Anthony D'Amato, 70 Northwestern University Law Review 798-812 (1976) 
 
Abstract:  This essay will attempt to show that the disparity between the rule of law and the dictates of morality is 
itself a product of the paradigmatic way in which the "Bad Samaritan" cases are analyzed. If we examine the cases 
in an entirely different way, many of the standard problems will dissolve and new alternatives will become apparent. 
The essay will also show that the "Bad Samaritan" paradigm is part of a larger paradigm linking the law of torts 
with the criminal law, which also needs to be reexamined. Finally a recommendation for dealing with the "Bad 
Samaritan" problem legislatively is offered. 
 




 [pg798]** Sometimes the structure of a legal argument seems so natural and compelling that 
its conclusion survives for decades or even centuries. [FN1] The conclusion persists because its 
challengers fail to reject the logical structure of the argument. Rather, they employ the same 
structure in trying to refute the argument. The structure seems so natural that they cannot get 
"outside" of it and thus fail in their attempt to offer a convincing alternative solution. An 
example of this type of paradigm is the "Bad Samaritan" line of cases in American law, 
establishing a rule that there is no duty to warn or rescue. This particular chapter of our law is 
unsettling as well as unsettled because of the disparity between the rule of law and the dictates of 
morality. This essay will attempt to show that this disparity is itself a product of the paradigmatic 
way in which the "Bad Samaritan" cases are analyzed. If we examine the cases in an entirely 
different way, many of the standard problems will dissolve and new alternatives will become 
apparent. The essay will also show that the "Bad Samaritan" paradigm is part of a larger 
paradigm linking the law of torts with the criminal law, which also needs to be reexamined. 
Finally a recommendation for dealing with the "Bad Samaritan" problem legislatively will be 
offered, although the essay's purpose is less to recommend a specific solution than to indicate a 
means of reconceptualization. 
 
THE STANDARD ANALYSIS 
 
 Articles and judicial opinions tend to begin their analysis from the viewpoint of the victim in 
a series of egregious cases where [pg799] strangers failed to utter a word of warning or lift a 
finger to help. Examples are numerous. Someone drowns while a man sitting on a dock simply 
witnesses the event without throwing down a rope that is at hand. [FN2] A man does nothing as 
his neighbor's child hammers on a dangerous explosive. [FN3] No warning is given to one who 
is walking into the jaws of a dangerous machine. [FN4] A boy, trespassing on a railroad, has a 
leg and arm cut off by the car wheels; the employees of the railroad fail to call a doctor or render 
any assistance and the boy bleeds to death. [FN5] In the most conspicuous recent example, a 
woman, Kitty Genovese, was attacked and beaten to death on a city street while 38 witnesses 
watched the killing from the safety of their apartments and failed to call the police. [FN6] In 
these and similar cases the courts have held that there is no tort liability for those who failed to 
warn, rescue, or call for assistance. 
 
 Without exception, commentators on these cases respond with moral if not legal 
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condemnation, finding these judicial results "morally barbaric" [FN7] and "revolting to any 
moral sense." [FN8] In a typical comment, one court said of a nonrescuer: "[H]e may, perhaps, 
justly be styled a ruthless savage and a moral monster; but he is not liable in damages...." [FN9] 
Searching for an analytical justification for the outcome of these cases, writers have suggested 
that the distinction between these and more typical tort cases is that these cases involve 
nonfeasance. [FN10] However, the apparent distinction between action [pg800] and inaction is 
no longer valid in such other areas of tort law as the manufacture of defective automobiles, or 
driving an automobile without prior inspection. [FN11] Another suggestion has been that the 
cases are anomalous in tort law, and that the courts are likely to close the gap between law and 
morality by finding a "special relationship" between the parties which justifies holding the 
defendant responsible to warn or rescue the plaintiff. [FN12] Specially related defendants now 
include, among others, carriers, innkeepers, employers, shopkeepers, jailers, schools, hospitals, 
and parents. [FN13] This characterization, however, has not been extended to include all 
licensors, [FN14] and an objective reading of the cases lends little support to the view that the 
courts are trying to close the gap, but rather affirms the theory of commentators McNiece and 
Thornton that the courts impose liability for nonfeasance only where a beneficial relationship 
exists on the part of the obligor towards the obligee. [FN15] Other writers express the hope that 
legislatures will correct the common law in the "Bad Samaritan" area by making it a statutory 
tort or crime to fail to warn or rescue. [FN16] Vermont has recently enacted such a statute. 
[FN17] A related class of statutes, increasingly common, makes it a crime to leave the scene of 
an automobile accident. [FN18] 
 
 [pg801]The paradigm thus consists of moral outrage at the "Bad Samaritan" from the victim's 
viewpoint, relatively unsuccessful attempts to explain the cases logically, and a call for judicial 
and legislative relief. Rarely is consideration given to the Samaritan's situation. Some limited 
attention has been given the defendant in statutes lowering due-care standards in order to 
encourage physicians to provide emergency treatment to injured persons. [FN19] One valuable 
study has examined European cases in which the Samaritan-rescuer is hurt and sues the victim. 
[FN20] These situations occur frequently in non-common-law countries where it is illegal for a 
person to fail to warn or rescue. [FN21] But generally, little attention is paid to the question of 
whether or not it would be fair to coerce a person into being a "good" rather than "bad" 
Samaritan, or whether such coercion, if desirable, should be exercised through the civil or 
criminal law. This indifference to the Samaritan's situation is reflected in Professor Franklin's 
casual statement that Vermont courts could appropriately "supplement" the statutory, criminally 
sanctioned duty to rescue with "extensive civil liability." [FN22] Professor Franklin's statement 
is certainly not atypical, and is singled out for mention only because the idea is treated so 
off-handedly in a generally incisive article. The easy equation of civil and criminal liability 
seems to be an integral feature of the paradigm. 
 
WHAT BASIS FOR TORT LIABILITY? 
 
 A starting point for the discussion of whether or not there should be tort liability is the 
following situation: a stranger S fails to [pg802] warn a victim V of impending peril, or to call 
for help, or to rescue him even though the rescue entails minimal risk. It is submitted that the 
courts are justified in holding that there should be no tort liability imposed upon S. However, in 
the next section it will be argued that criminal liability should be imposed upon S by statute. 
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 In a civil action, V would basically be claiming an entitlement against S to be rescued by S. 
[FN23] If the law were to recognize such an action, S would either have to rescue V or be liable 
in damages. But, suppose V is a thrill seeker who wants to risk his life in such a way that 
someone else will be forced either to rescue him or to pay his hospital bills. For example, V 
decides to dive from a bridge into a river, even though he cannot swim, because S happens to be 
sitting on the bank of the river. Should the fact that S is sitting there, watching V dive into the 
river and then struggle to stay afloat, mean that S, a good swimmer, suddenly becomes liable to 
V's widow for damages unless he jumps in and rescues V? Would the situation be different if S, 
seeing V about to dive from the bridge, yells to him "Don't jump," or "If you jump, I won't 
rescue you"? What if S says, "I'm going to look the other way and put cotton in my ears"? 
 
 More generally, what can S do to avoid having the claimed entitlement arise? Since the 
entitlement V claims rests upon S's inaction (in this case S's failure to rescue), to escape liability 
S would have to act. If he runs away from the scene while V is still on the bridge, has S removed 
himself from the "Samaritan" relation? Surely V would argue that S unreasonably was evading 
his responsibilities. But if one concludes that V's action in jumping off the bridge automatically 
gives him an entitlement against S, we make S an insurer of every reckless act that he happens to 
see or that has been staged for his particular detriment. 
 
 [pg803] If the preceding hypothetical situation seems too unrealistic, consider a case where 
V does not deliberately risk injury. S and V are inspecting archeological ruins, and V approaches 
the edge of a precipice to get a better view. "Watch out," warns S, "there's loose footing and you 
might fall." V replies, "You're just too cautious," takes another step, and promptly falls. On these 
facts, should S be obligated either to rescue V or be subject to liability in damages? 
 
 Another question is whether S would be able to insure himself against the damages V might 
claim if the law were to give V an entitlement to be rescued. Such insurance would be more 
expensive for S1 who is young, healthy, and a lover of the outdoors, than for S2 , who is hard of 
hearing, poor of eyesight, and inclined to stay indoors. This may well penalize an individual's 
freedoms of travel and association. [FN24] 
 
 It is possible that S would not even be able to get insurance for an act that could be an 
intentional violation of the law. [FN25] Assuming the law gives V an entitlement to be rescued, 
if S fails to rescue V, S has intentionally failed to do something required by the law, and an 
insurance company might not be willing to sell S an insurance policy to cover such situations. 
This, then, is a further reason for discrediting V's claimed entitlement. It is more likely that V 
would be able to get accident insurance than it is that S would be able to procure failure-to-warn 
or failure-to-rescue insurance. 
 
 Of course, V will argue that he would not have taken the risk that led to his imperilment but 
for the fact that S was nearby. In [pg804] other words he will assert that he relied to some extent 
on S's potential assistance, and that this reliance is the basis for his entitlement to be rescued. S 
can respond that under existing law he is under no legal obligation to rescue V, and a court 
should not fashion a legal obligation out of V's mistake of law. But this argument might prove 
unpersuasive to a court, which might hold that the obviously strong moral obligation upon S 
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could reasonably have been relied upon by V. Furthermore, a judge might find that these facts 
are precisely what he has been waiting for in order to change the old immoral common law 
anyway! Thus a better argument for S is a combination of the ones previously given: S's right to 
freedom coupled with the need to deter intentionally foolish or highly negligent and risky actions 
by persons in the vicinity of S. The courts should not impair S's freedom to travel by making him 
a walking insurer for foolhardy or thrill-seeking persons. Yet S's presence in the vicinity of V 
should make a difference to a legislature contemplating a statute making it a crime for S to fail to 
warn or to rescue. 
 




 I now want to argue that it is not inconsistent both to reject civil liability and to advocate the 
passage of a statute making the failure to warn or rescue a criminal offense. One such statute is 
Vermont's "Duty to Aid the Endangered Act" which places a maximum fine of $100 for willful 
violation of the following section: [FN26] 
    A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the extent 
that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or without interference with 
important duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that 
assistance or care is being provided by others. 
 
 Despite any implications to the contrary in the discussion to this point, I believe that it is 
immoral for S to refuse to assist V when there is no danger to S. But in examining my own 
reasons to support this ethical conclusion, I find the problem to be rather perplexing. This belief 
may result from the paradigm criticized earlier which starts by taking V's viewpoint and ignoring 
S's. However, S might argue that in an overpopulated world there should be a natural [pg805] 
selecting out of foolhardy risk-takers like V. V's reply is that S should rescue V because he 
should do unto others what he would have others do unto him. [FN27] But in the archeological 
ruins example, where S would not stand near the precipice and warned V not to do so, it would 
be false to argue that their situations could be reversed. [FN28] Moreover, one must consider the 
possible impact upon morality of enacting a rescue law such as Vermont's. As matters stand now, 
if S rescues V he does so purely out of moral considerations, and is deserving of praise for his 
altruistic actions.  [FN29] Once a law is passed, S will not be acting out of altruism but out of his 
own self-interest in avoiding the criminal sanction of the law. Thus, the law has arguably 
destroyed the basis for altruistic behavior by requiring it.  [FN30] However, the fact that a 
majority of the members of a state might find it in their self-interest to pass such legislation does 
not necessarily deprive any smaller class of people of the possibility of moral behavior. If the 
behavior is morally required, then it should not be significant that it be labelled "altruistic." 
 
 In any case, argument for a Vermont-type statute need not rest upon moral considerations but 
rather may be based on pure Hobbesian expediency. [FN31] Suppose V is drowning and above 
him on the dock is a coil of rope which S could easily push into the water. It was argued earlier 
that S should have no duty personally to V to push over the rope. Even if he had such a duty, S 
might be judgment-proof, and thus the potential tort liability would not induce him to save the 
[pg806] drowning man. Yet, should not V have some "claim" over S sufficient to require S to 
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throw down the rope? Suppose there are 15 S's sitting on the dock and none of them moves; 
should not V have some means of coercing them to act? V can argue: "I took a risk in these 
waters even though I cannot swim (or even though I knew I might get a sudden cramp) because I 
resolved to stay close to the dock, because I knew there was a coil of rope on the dock, and 
because there were some people around. I did not take the risk because I wanted them to insure 
me against injuries, since I have no civil entitlement against any of them. But there should be 
some law forcing them to throw me the rope to save my life at no risk to them." [FN32] 
 
 The next step in the argument is to note that V might be any citizen. Everyone is aware of the 
existence of other people around him and, at least subconsciously, relies upon that fact. Kitty 
Genovese walking a city street at night probably relied to some extent upon the fact that the 
street was lit and there were many neighbors around, some of whom would be at or near their 
windows and would hear and be responsive to any call for help. If she had been in the middle of 
a park surrounded only by trees, she would have been assuming a much greater risk. That risk 
may have deterred her from walking in a park late at night. But on a city street, even in the 
evening, she had a right to assume that part of her "environment" was a number of neighbors 
who could easily call for assistance. V expects strangers in the vicinity to warn or assist him not 
because they owe him a personal duty, but because they are members of society and ought to act 
responsibly. To be sure, a legal system might "teach" people that such reliance is unjustified, but 
here we are considering probable social attitudes in a prelaw hypothetical context. Thus the "Bad 
Samaritan" in the extreme cases cited at the beginning of this essay was acting antisocially in 
failing to do what society [pg807] felt he was ethically obligated to do, even though he was not 
violating a personal duty owed to the stranger-victim. 
 
 Since antisocial behavior constitutes a "public wrong," [FN33] it can appropriately be made 
the subject of a criminal statute. American law has too easily and automatically equated criminal 
wrongs with civil harms, "violation of statute" as a standard for negligence being one example. 
[FN34] Yet there is an important difference even in respect to strictly personal crimes. A 
murderer harms society as well as his victim. The distinction is recognized by the fact that the 
victim's consent does not justify the homicide from the criminal law standpoint. Furthermore, the 
decision whether to go ahead with the prosecution for any crime is the state's. [FN35] The victim 
cannot compel the state to drop the prosecution, since the state is vindicating a public wrong in 
addition to the victim's private injury, which the victim may or may not choose to proceed with 
in a civil action for damages. Therefore, if a state wishes to enact a Vermont-type statute, it can 
do so for reasons that are similar to those underlying any other criminal legislation—to protect a 
distinctly societal interest. [FN36] 
 
 Although V can reasonably expect to be safer in the presence of others than if alone in a park 
or dark alley, the argument for a Vermont-type statute certainly cannot rest upon this 
expectation, since the argument ultimately begs the question. Indeed, one might suggest that it is 
foolish of V to have any such expectation; perhaps the Kitty Genovese killing "taught" the public 
that it is unreasonable to expect a measure of safety on a public street. To justify the 
Vermont-type statute, therefore, one should look at a more universal self- interested basis for 
criminal legislation. This comes from the ability of each citizen to see himself in the role of V. 
Even the "Bad Samaritan" can imagine being an accident victim someday, in which case he 
would want anyone in the vicinity to be forced by law to be a "Good Samaritan." [FN37] This 
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potential role reversal does not have the [pg808] same application in the tort-law situation 
discussed previously. First, if S is rich and V judgment-proof, S might be induced to save V, but 
when the roles are reversed V might have no similar incentive to save S. Second, tort liability is 
subject to abuse: V might deliberately engage in risky conduct in S's presence because he wants 
S to be his insurer or wants to have a final reckless fling knowing that if he dies his survivors can 
recover a considerable amount in damages by suing S for wrongful death. Third, and more 
generally, imposing tort liability gives a monetary reward to risk takers and penalizes risk 
avoiders; such personality traits are not role reversible, and hence the argument that S might be 
in V's position someday is not persuasive. 
 
 On the criminal side, the positions are reciprocal precisely because the element of monetary 
compensation for the accident is removed. V may be more accident prone than S because V may 
be a risk taker and S a risk avoider, but there is no tort law that compensates V at S's expense. 
Rather, V is penalized for his risk taking (and hence deterred) by the injuries he receives. S is 
penalized only by the criminal law if he fails to assist V when he easily could have done so. This 
sort of penalty is fair to S because he may someday be in V's position although that possibility 
may be small compared to V's own likelihood. [FN38] 
 
  A criminal statute makes sense, therefore, because it deters antisocial conduct on the part of 
the "Bad Samaritan." Civil liability, however, cannot be justified because there is no moral 
reason why S should have to compensate V for actions which S did not cause and which S even 
may have tried to prevent. S's failure to help should be punished by the criminal law, and that 
sanction should be appropriately related to what S did or failed to do. [FN39] The sanction 
should not [pg809] be tied to V's injury for which S's omission was causally unrelated [FN40] 
and for which V alone should be responsible. Moreover, it would be ill-considered to argue for 
tort liability as an additional deterrent factor; the criminal penalty can be set by society at any 
level necessary to strike the correct balance between the need for deterrence and other values 
such as S's freedom of mobility. Furthermore, tort liability would operate as an uneven penalty in 
addition to the statutorily determined criminal penalty; it is ineffective against the poor or the 




 Legal and moral rules are in symbiotic relation; one "learns" what is moral by observing 
what other people (initially, parents) tend to enforce. [FN42] Professor Franklin has cited 
statistically significant surveys indicating that more of the public will regard the duty to rescue 
as morally required in jurisdictions where it is also legally required. [FN43] Even the Vermont 
statute prescribing only a $100 fine for failure to give assistance should heighten the public's 
moral sense. Thus we may assume that a Vermont-type statute will be a factor in helping people 
in distress even when the Samaritan is the only other person on the scene and the appeal must be 
to his sense of ethics. 
 
 A criminal statute will also work in more traditional ways. S will certainly be motivated to 
help if a policeman is in the vicinity, and he will also give assistance to the victim if there are 
nonofficial witnesses around who could later testify in a criminal proceeding against S. Even 
where S and V are alone, if S refuses to give [pg810] assistance and V escapes with his life, V 
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can later report S's violation to the authorities. The criminal statute, unlike tort liability, has the 
effect of making S's behavior a matter of public interest. 
 
 In addition, prosecutorial discretion provides an important safeguard for potential 
Samaritans. For example, assume a jurisdiction has a Vermont-type statute as well as a civil 
action for tort based upon the statutory standard. V gets a cramp in turbulent waters and calls for 
help. S, a wealthy person but a poor swimmer, decides he probably would not be able to rescue 
V himself, so instead he runs to get help. But when the people he summons arrive, S has 
drowned. On these facts, it is extremely unlikely that a prosecutor would indict S for violation of 
the statute. But V's heirs might not be similarly deterred from bringing a civil action for 
wrongful death since there is a possibility that a jury might disbelieve S's assessment of his own 
swimming ability. Furthermore, the possibility of such jury action, coupled with the notoriety 
that the case might engender, might induce S to settle with V's heirs for a significant amount to 
avoid the litigation and publicity. Or consider the example of V deliberately taking a risk 
because a rich S is nearby. Here, too, the state would probably decide not to prosecute but V's 
heirs might not have similar reservations. Prosecutorial discretion is, of course, a general 
safeguard for defendants in criminal cases. In the Samaritan situation, because the defendant's 
difficult-to-assess judgment whether or not to act is the essence of the crime, the prosecutor's 




 On the basis of the foregoing considerations, the adoption of a Vermont-type statute coupled 
with a statutory provision explicitly prohibiting any private action based upon violation of the 
statutory standard is the proper solution to the "Bad Samaritan" problem. The Vermont statute 
does not contain such a prohibition. Upon reflection, however, a legislator should determine that 
the same moral considerations which prompt him to require S to give assistance to V also should 
bar V from obtaining compensation or restitution from S. The criminal sanction is fair provided 
that there is no additional civil liability. It is possible that the tendency to assume that torts can 
be fashioned out of crimes accounts for the reluctance of other states to pass a Vermont-type 
statute. Legislators may feel that, while the common law presently works a hardship [pg811] 
upon V, a crime-plus-tort package would work a hardship upon S. If this is so, then an explicit 
statutory prohibition of the tort action would be an important part of the legislation. 
 
 Another important part of the statutory solution, only alluded to here since it has been 
discussed at length elsewhere, [FN44] is the need to provide S with compensation from V if S is 
injured in the act of helping V. Without this potential for compensation, S's decision to act would 
be affected by his calculation of the comparative costs of violating or complying with the statute. 
Despite Professor Posner's analysis, [FN45] it is unwise to view the criminal law in cost-benefit 
terms. Rather, it should be a set of rules with which one ought to comply, apart from economic 
calculations, precisely because legal rules should be congruent with rules of morality. S's first 
thought ought to be compliance with the statute, but he should not be penalized for complying by 
an injury sustained in the process of rescuing V. If he were so penalized, S would undoubtedly 
be inclined to assess the criminal law in economic terms. Thus, the statute I propose would 
provide that S is entitled to compensation from V for any time, trouble, or injury incurred in 
rescuing V.  [FN46] This should be so even if S is a doctor who renders unsolicited emergency 
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aid to V. [FN47] 
 
 [pg812] One possible objection to the proposal presented here is that it requires adding to an 
already overlong list of crimes in our society. I am indeed reluctant in principle to propose a new 
crime, but a more important consideration is that of reducing the gap between criminal and moral 
rules. In the Samaritan case, this dictates adding to the criminal rules; in the victimless crime 
context, on the other hand, this consideration requires decriminalizing conduct no longer 




 This essay has offered an alternative paradigm to that which is typically employed in the 
"Bad Samaritan" cases. Instead of beginning with the victim's viewpoint and regarding the law as 
a fitful attempt to catch up with twentieth century morality, it has attempted to show that from 
the potential Samaritan's perspective there are compelling reasons why he should not be required 
to compensate the victim. Moreover, it is suggested that there is a critical difference between the 
impact of criminal law and tort law upon this problem, and, surprisingly, the former may be far 
more desirable. Such a conclusion is inconsistent with the usual American approach of finding 
equivalences between public and private harms, but this may be the exceptional case which 
illuminates that important distinction. Legislatures cannot be expected to adopt quickly the 
proposal suggested here, largely because their thinking is the same as that of legal writers and 
judges. As Professor Kuhn has noted, new paradigms do not replace old ones in the history of 
science because they are more logical; rather, the old ones persist until those holding them die of 
old age. Hopefully, the progress of the law is not quite so slow, because the stakes are high. 
There is a need for help from a stranger when an accident occurs, and the law should attempt to 




*Copyright by Anthony D'Amato, 1976.  A.B., Cornell, 1958; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1961; 
Ph.D., Columbia University, 1968; Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. 
This article is part of a jurisprudential research project on the relation of law and morality. The 
author wishes to thank Professor Martin Redish, Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern 
University School of Law, for suggestions on the drafting of this essay.   
**Numbers in the format pg798 etc. refer to the paging of the original article. 
 
[FN1] The operations of paradigms in scientific thought have been described by Professor Kuhn. 
T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). See also S. TOULMIN, HUMAN 
UNDERSTANDING 261-477 (1972). 
 
[FN2] Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301 (1928). Cf. Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 
155 A.2d 343 (1959). 
 
[FN3] Sidwell v. McVay, 282 P.2d 756 (Okla.1955). 
 
[FN4] Gautret v. Egerton, L.R.2 C.P. 371, 375 (1867) (dictum); Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 
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N.H. 257, 44 A. 809 (1898). 
 
[FN5] Union Pac. R.R. v. Cappier, 66 Kan. 649, 72 P. 281 (1903). 
 
[FN6] See A. ROSENTHAL, THIRTY-EIGHT WITNESSES (1964). The witnesses said they did not 
want to get involved, and a year later they still did not see why they should have acted. See N.Y. 
Times Mar. 12, 1965, at 35, col. 6, 37. 
 
[FN7] Reckseen, The Duty to Rescue, 47 IND.L.J. 321, 321-22 (1972). 
 
[FN8] W. PROSSER, TORTS 341 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. For similar views 
see the various essays in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966) 
[hereinafter cited as THE GOOD SAMARITAN]. See also Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV.L.REV. 
97 (1908); [hereinafter cited as Ames]; Dyke, The Duty to Aid One in Peril Good Samaritan 
Laws, 15 HOW.L.J. 672 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Dyke]; Rudolph, The Duty to Act: A 
Proposed Rule, 44 NEB.L.REV. 499 (1965); Scheid, Affirmative Duty to Act in Emergency 
Situations—The Return of the Good Samaritan, 3 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRACT. & PROC. 1 (1969) 
[hereinafter cited as Scheid]; Note, Good Samaritans and Liability for Medical Malpractice, 64 
COLUM.L.REV. 1301 (1964) [hereinafter cited as COLUMBIA NOTE]. 
 
[FN9] Buch v. Amory, 69 N.H. 257, 260, 44 A. 809, 810 (1898). 
 
[FN10] PROSSER, supra note 8, at 338-40; Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of 
Tort Liability, 56 U.PA.L.REV. 217, 219-21 (1908). 
 
[FN11] See McNiece & Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272, 1273-77 
(1949) [hereinafter cited as McNiece]; Wright, Negligent Acts or Omissions, 19 CAN.B.REV. 465 
(1941). 
 
[FN12] F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.6 (1956). 
 
[FN13] PROSSER, supra note 8, at 342. 
 
[FN14] McNiece, supra note 11, at 1274-75. 
 
[FN15] Id. at 1284, citing F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 220 (1926). One writer 
finds this notion of "consideration" to be "an afterthought by way of justification." Scheid, supra 
note 8, at 11. Perhaps it is if the cases are analyzed on contract principles. To say that S, a 
teacher, has a duty to rescue V, her pupil, simply because V confers an economic benefit to S 
hardly distinguishes S from a stranger standing nearby who also could have rescued the 
drowning pupil. But in tort terms, cf. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87-89 (1974), V 
could legitimately expect and rely upon his teacher to aid him in a situation that was structured 
largely by the teacher (e.g., S decided to take the class on an outing by the lake) while there can 
be no similar reliance upon a stranger standing nearby. This expectation-reliance factor, 
symbolized by the "special relationship" terminology of the cases, is strengthened by the causal 
connection involved (the teacher, but not the stranger, was responsible for the child being there 
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at that particular time). See L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 63-64 (1930). 
 
[FN16] See Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment, 25 STAN.L.REV. 51 (1972) 
[hereinafter cited as Franklin]; THE GOOD SAMARITAN, supra note 8, at 243, 279. 
 
[FN17] VT.STAT.ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973). 
 
[FN18] See, e.g., ILL.REV.STAT. ch. 95½ , § 11-403 (1973);  W.VA.CODE ch. 17-C, art. 4, §§ 1, 3 
(Michie 1974); CAL.VEH.CODE § 20003 (West 1971). 
 
[FN19] See COLUMBIA NOTE, supra note 8. For a speculative treatment see Rudolph, supra note 
8, at 512-19. Should the passerby be forced to intervene only when there is no personal peril to 
him at all, or when his risk is merely proportionately less than the victim's harm? This requires a 
legislative decision if a criminal statute is considered. For a brief discussion see Scheid, supra 
note 8, at 13-14. Cf. Dawson, Rewards for the Rescue of Human Life? in THE GOOD SAMARITAN, 
supra note 8, at 63 [hereinafter cited as Dawson, Rewards]. 
 
[FN20] Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler, 74 HARV.L.REV. 817 (1961) 
[hereinafter cited as Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio]. See also Rudzinski, The Duty to Rescue: A 
Comparative Analysis, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN, supra note 8, at 91 [hereinafter cited as 
Rudzinski]. 
 
[FN21] Rudzinski counts 15 European countries with criminal code provisions stipulating a duty 
to rescue. Rudzinski, supra note 20, at 92. See also Hofstetter & Marschall, Amendment of the 
Belgian Code Pénal: The Duty to Rescue Persons in Serious Danger, 11 AM.J.COMP.L. 66 
(1962). 
 
[FN22] Franklin, supra note 16, at 56. However, Professor Epstein has recently attempted to 
support the common-law result in the Samaritan cases in a thought-provoking article. See 
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.LEG.STUD. 151, 189-204 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 
Epstein]. 
 
[FN23] See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV.L.REV. 1089 (1972). See also Epstein, supra note 22. Despite his 
admission that the common-law Samaritan rule "does not appeal to our highest sense of 
benevolence and charity," id. at 197, Professor Epstein tries to justify or rationalize the rule by 
taking a position that seems to lie uneasily between morals and economics. He insists that the 
defendant physically must have caused the plaintiff's injury (even if nonnegligently), but this in 
itself is hardly a conclusive moral test and, as criticized by Posner, hardly a rational economic 
test either. See Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J.LEG.STUD. 205, 217-19 (1973) 
[hereinafter cited as Posner, Strict Liability]. Neither Epstein nor Posner suggest a criminal-law 
remedy, Epstein because he has rationalized the common-law tort approach and Posner because 
he seems to view criminal law as limited by economic considerations. See text accompanying 
note 45 infra. 
 
[FN24] Such freedoms in the Samaritan context are sometimes treated as nineteenth century 
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anachronisms. In a famous early article, Dean Ames saw a wide ambit for individual freedom as 
characteristic of legal systems which have not reached maturity. See Ames, supra note 8. Cf. 
McNiece, supra note 11, at 1288. Dean Prosser, citing Leon Green, writes that "the highly 
individualistic philosophy of the older common law ... shrank from converting the courts into an 
agency for forcing men to help one another." PROSSER, supra note 8, at 339, citing L. GREEN, 
JUDGE AND JURY 62 (1930). 
 But a more insightful approach would appear to be that advocated by Professor Nozick—
namely, to view the state as a minimal mutual protective association. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, 
STATE AND UTOPIA 26-119 (1974). If the majority of citizens feel the need for forcing others to 
rescue them, let them secure a legislative majority and pass a statute. But to achieve such a result 
judicially might be to impose a distinctly minority solution that would undamentally endanger 
individual freedom. 
 Note, however, that legislative and judicial solutions are not and, as we shall see, should not 
be interchangeable. Most obviously, the statutory solution would probably be a criminal statute, 
a remedy which the courts cannot create judicially. 
 
[FN25] See Franklin, supra note 16, at 56 n. 35. 
 
[FN26] VT.STAT.ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973). 
 
[FN27] See R. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON 86-111 (1963). 
 
[FN28] In the Biblical case, Luke 10:29-37, the "Good Samaritan" not only bound up the 
stranger's wounds, but took him to an inn, fed him, and left the inkeeper a sum of money. Perfect 
altruism would seem to require one to give all he possesses to the poor and spend his life 
assisting others without pay. 
 
[FN29] See D. HUME, ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS § 2 (1777). 
 
[FN30] This argument seems persuasive until one realizes that universal altruism is 
self-contradictory. Suppose four perfectly altruistic persons are stranded on a desert island: A 
gives his hut to B, who simultaneously has given his hut to C, who gives his to D; and D gives 
his to A. Each person is now living in a hut, the only difference being that the hut, moments 
before, belonged to another. These transactions or swaps can occur constantly, but the resulting 
"altruism" is indistinguishable from self-interest. 
 This situation is even more circular if each person declares that he will only be altruistic 
toward those who deserve it. Thus, B will give his hut to C only if C gives his hut to someone 
else. Not only does this "lock in" the altruism, but curiously it sets up the expectation of reward 
for one's altruism, which is self-contradictory. 
 
[FN31] T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN chs. 13, 21 (1651) (to the effect that security is the only, and 
ultimate, value). 
 
[FN32] This sort of argument, incidentally, parallels the self-interested contractual reasoning of 
those in Rawls' construct of an "original position" which he offers as the moral basis of a just 
society. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-22 (1971). See also E. CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION 
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190-97 (1955). Posner recognizes a related situation as having high transaction costs. See 
Posner, Strict Liability, supra note 23, at 219. But his economic analysis seems inappropriate: in 
"warning" cases, any transaction would be absurd since the negotiations would give away the 
warning, whereas in "rescue" cases, while negotiations are feasible, the "bargain" ultimately 
struck would probably be absurd (what is the coiled rope worth to the drowning person? A 
million dollars? Five million? What if he is poor? Or if he reneges once he is saved?) The 
noneconomic criminal-law approach seems preferable to Professor Posner's economic solution. 
 
[FN33] Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV.L.REV. 317  (1914) [hereinafter 
cited as Thayer]. 
 
[FN34] See Thayer, supra note 33; Note, The Use of Criminal Statutes in the Creation of New 
Torts, 48 COLUM.L.REV. 456 (1948). 
 
[FN35] P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 8 (1965). 
 
[FN36] Not all crimes, of course, have definable individual victims; consider counterfeiting, 
espionage, flag desecration, etc. 
 
[FN37] Rousseau in his Social Contract pointed out that even a thief wants the laws of private 
property enforced; the very point of his act is to transfer property to his own exclusive enjoyment 
which he then expects the police to safeguard like any other property. J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL 
CONTRACT I, vii-ix (1762). 
 
[FN38] Incidentally, if criminal-law penalties could be made an exact science, the amount of the 
penalty in a Vermont-type statute should be computed, in part, (the most important factor being 
an assessment of what it will take to deter "Bad Samaritan" behavior) on the probability of S 
being an accident victim and not on V's (that is, the risk taker's) probabilities, for the more V's 
situation is taken into account the more the criminal law would tend to operate as compensation 
to V and as a redistribution of values from risk avoiders to risk takers. 
 
[FN39] As Professor Franklin points out, there could be criminal liability for failure to act even 
though later events show that the rescue in fact would not have succeeded. Franklin, supra note 
16, at 55. Although he did not pursue this thought, it might be added that his observation further 
distinguishes tort from criminal liability in as much as prosecution might attach even if V's death 
appeared certain and imminent, as French and Polish decisions have affirmed. See Rudzinski, 
supra note 20, at 101 nn. 28, 29. It is hard to imagine that a jury would reach the same result in a 
civil action for damages. 
 
[FN40] This is, of course, excluding for the present discussion any "special relationship" 
between S and V. The text here does not fully accept Professor Epstein's insistence upon 
physical causation. See Epstein, supra note 22. Causation or lack thereof is not conclusive of the 
moral issue. But it does serve to differentiate the tort approach from the criminal remedy in an 
argument that recognizes the latter as normatively essential. 
 
[FN41] Apparently, so far only the German courts have reached the result that there is no tort 
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liability in addition to the criminal-code duty to rescue. See Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio, supra 
note 20, at 1107 n. 80. The French courts, in contrast, add the tort liability to the criminal 
sanction. Id. at 1107-08. 
 
[FN42] See J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1952). 
 
[FN43] Franklin, supra note 16, at 58-60, citing inter alia ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR: 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SOME ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES (J. Macaulay & 
L. Berkowitz, eds. 1970). See also Gusfield, Social Sources of Levites and Samaritans, in THE 
GOOD SAMARITAN, supra note 8: "The very passage of a law is an act of public definition of 
what is moral or immoral." Id. at 196. 
 
[FN44] See Dawson, Rewards, supra note 19; Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio, supra note 20. 
 
[FN45] R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 357-60 (1972). 
 
[FN46] European sources consulted by Professor Dawson indicate no disposition for 
compensating the rescuer for his time spent and risk incurred when the risk did not result in loss. 
See Dawson, Rewards, supra note 19, at 84. But clearly it is in the public's self-interest to have 
some such compensation mechanism. The Kitty Genovese killing (see note 6 supra) raises the 
basic issue. A witness might well ponder the fact that if he calls the police he will set in motion a 
personal involvement that would include police questioning, pretrial depositions, line-up 
inspection, appearing as a witness at the trial of the assailant, perhaps death threats if the 
defendant has "mob" connections, newspaper publicity and loss of privacy. In light of these 
noncompensable costs, is it any wonder that each of the 38 witnesses concluded, "Let someone 
else notify the police"? 
 
[FN47] A number of "Good Samaritan" statutes lower the standard of due care for rescuers so 
that they will be encouraged to perform the rescue operation in the first place. See COLUMBIA 
NOTE, supra note 8, at 1308-12; Dyke, supra note 8, at 680-83. These statutes attack a symptom 
of the Samaritan problem while ignoring its cause. If we were to have a criminal statute 
requiring rescue, one sees no reason why a reasonable man standard cannot be applied to the 
rescue attempt. Why should the law encourage bumbling or negligent rescues once the duty has 
devolved upon everyone to render assistance to an imperiled victim? 
 One problem that may arise if Vermont-type statutes become widespread is the  "phony" 
accident designed to lure a driver into stopping his car. Scheid, supra note 8, at 1 n. 2, discusses 
a news story concerning a driver stopping to aid what seemed to be a stalled motorist, and 
getting robbed of his car for his pains. However, it is not clear that Vermont-type statutes will 
add to the phony accident set-up which already is fairly common absent those statutes. Indeed, 
such statutes might result in every driver along the road stopping to investigate the "accident," 
with the result that the would-be robbers would be deterred! Conceivably the "phony accident" 
ploy works better when only one out of every 50 or 100 drivers who are uncommonly altruistic 
will stop their cars; a law "forcing" everyone to be "altruistic" could help deter the phony 
accident scheme. 
 
[FN48] Once the public begins to regard certain acts as no longer immoral (e.g., acts of sexual 
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"perversion" that still are proscribed criminally in most jurisdictions) decriminalizing them will 
accelerate the public's view that they are not immoral acts; the symbiotic relation between law 
and morals works in this direction as well. 
